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Political predictions in Nepal
Aditya Man Shrestha
It would have been much better if somebody had told the story that I am going to tell you.
The story is all about political predictions in Nepal inadvertently made in course of
writing in the Nepalese newspapers particularly The Kathmandu Post and The Himalayan
Times. I am not an astrologer professed to predict political events on the basis of the
interplay of the planets. However, what was foreseen during the dispassionate analysis
came out true even to my own astonishment. For want of anybody coming forth to tell the
story, I have come forward myself.
To pick up the latest case of the Madhesh uprising, the forecast about it came out
incredibly true. Some 28 months ago, in September 2004 I had said that there would be
"an uprising of the Madhesis" and that really took place in 2007. There was however
nothing extraordinary what had been said. It was pointed out that "there is increasing
consensual demand for re-organization of the State with recognition for a right to selfdetermination, federal system of government with utmost autonomy to indigenous
community and fair representation in the national legislature, executive and judicial
branches. The Madhesi leaders have made it clear that uprising is in the offing for the
fulfillment of these aspirations." What was actually extraordinary was complete oblivion
of the obvious facts on the part of the agitators-turned-rulers.1
Linked with this prediction was yet another prophesy more serious and more
consequential. However that is open to question. It was said that the Madhesi movement
“is the beginning of the end of Nepal. It is not because the Madhesis want to break the
country into pieces but mainly because our leadership is too insensitive and incapable of
keeping a diverse people united.” Going by the current chaotic developments in the Terai
region, it would not take a long time to see the disintegration of the country happening. It
is because the government has no control over it, the Maoists have been made the target
of their old friends and new enemies, and the Madhesi rebel groups are too many to be
brought into order. On top of it, the role of India, the government and the nongovernment forces, is too pervasive and divisive. Nepalese leadership has no capability to
keep the country united.
When it came to the question of King Gyanendra, things came out almost everything true.
Before the king dismissed the Sher Bahadur Deuba government and took over, for
example, executive power on Oct. 4, 2002 I had said he would do it and take Nepal 50
years back. He did it true to the every word I had foretold. He exercised discretionary
power under the Article 127 in dismissing and appointing prime ministers and ministers
as his grandfather and father were doing in the 1950s and 1960s. 2
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Subsequently, I made a firm assertion in July 2003 that King Gyanendra was no
constitutional monarch. Those who thought he was were fools. By 2005, following the
royal direct takeover, it became clear that the king did not subscribe to the principle of
constitutional monarchy.3
If more evidence were required, we can refer to Dr. Tulsi Giri who minced no words in
2005 on this issue. He declared that the people could choose between democracy and
monarchy, an expression of the king’s mind. It is worthwhile to recollect that the king
abandoned the use of the “constitutional monarchy” in his public speeches together with
the oft-quoted multiparty democracy. To add, he wanted to be not only seen but also
heard by the people. He wanted to play the role of a constructive monarch. The royal
takeover of 1 Feb. 2005 was the climax of this aphorism.4
As explained in July 2003, the king made a choice of following the Mahendrapath of
revising active monarchy in 2005. In this attempt, I pointed out, he could come out with a
new agenda of peace making and nation building. He could ask his people to keep quiet
and follow him for, say, two years, five years or ten years. Just after one and a half years,
the king asked for three years to restore peace and consolidate democracy.5
In August 2003, it was explained that the king could and would use the symbolic
Sudarshan chakra (a powerful weapon belonging to Lord Krishan) in the form of the
army, the police and the state machinery. That, of course, he did to the utmost following
the royal takeover and declaration of the state of emergency. His actions came close to
further details envisaged in 2003. He rounded up, as King Mahendra did in 1960, all the
prominent political leaders and put them behind bars. On the other hand, he gave the
security forces marching orders to smash out the last fortress of the Maoist rebels. A
reign of terror, massacre and bloodshed resulted, as envisaged, from the release of his
Sudarshan Chakra.
In October 2003, it was also contemplated that the king could afford to ignore the rebels;
the political parties and the foreign powers provided he could take care of the people,
their security and their welfare. Indeed, in 2005, he did it by suppressing the political
leaders, ignoring the international community and assaulting the rebels. He too undertook
frequent tours of different regions of the country to go close to the people and attend to
their grievances. But how he failed in his attempts is a different story.
In Sept. 2005, it was already clear that the king was losing grounds in his direct rule. In
this background, I had sounded a note of caution that a king at the giving end could soon
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turn into a receiving end as it had happened in the case of his elder brother King Birendra
in 1990. “It is the turn of the present king (Gyanendra) to be able to read the gravity of
the situation and act in time. In other words, he should not allow the situation to drift in
such a way that would put his position from a giving to a receiving end as was observed
in the run-up to 1990 change-over.” Being all-powerful he was certainly at the giving end
at that point of time. But before eight months thenceforth, he got into a receiving end
after losing all powers to the agitating political parties.6
In October 2005, I described how the king had been lucky throughout his career despite
the bad luck of his kingdom. However, there was a note of warning stating “either the
king has to make his country as lucky as he is or the unlucky country will eventually
make the king equally unlucky. There is no way for the king to remain lucky forever and
his people suffering from interminable bad luck.” It took hardly six months when the
Jana Aandolan II started and turned the king utterly unlucky. 7
It is the article published in The Kathmandu Post on 30 September 2002 that pointed out
eight potential scenarios, which became, to a large extent, the reality within two years.
The first and foremost vindication of the prediction was established just after a couple of
days of its publication, as stated earlier, when King Gyanendra assumed all executive
power on October 4 of the same year by dismissing Sher Bahadur Deuba government. At
a time when there were too many speculations on the use of Article 127 of the
constitution and the politicians and lawyers were asking the king to exercise the power
according to their advice I had clearly stated that the failure to hold the elections
“eventually leads to the invocation of Article 127 of the constitution that empowers the
king to exercise discretionary power for its resolution. It means that we are swinging
back some 50 years when the king was free to nominate cabinet ministers according to
his choice.” No matter how many protests had been made since then against this
“regressive” royal move the situation remained for several years unchanged with royal
will prevailing.
Secondly, it spoke of the expansion of the Maoist control over the rural areas. It said,
“While Prime Minister Deuba, his cabinet colleagues and other political leaders keep on
debating with frequent somersaults over the election issue, the Article 127 implications
and the all-party coalition government, the Maoists might exploit this opportunity to
expand their existing control over an estimated one third of Nepal especially in the rural
areas.” That is exactly what the Maoists did in two years’ time extending their influence
all over the rural areas and increasing capability of striking at any district headquarters.
Thirdly, it said, “We may even witness the 1990 scenario reenacted when Patan was
under seize of the democratic forces fighting against the Panchayat rule. Let us just
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imagine, the Maoists infiltrate Bhaktapur or Lalitpur and launch a house-to-house fight
against our security forces. We cannot imagine applying the Rolpa or Rukum counter
operations in these cities. Perhaps we will go back to the Malla days when the city-states
of Kantipur, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur conducted their warfare against each other for
supremacy over the valley.”
The security forces that claimed to have foiled the Maoist plot to launch an attack in the
valley early 2005 corroborated this phenomenon. They even put the weapons, grenades
and their accessories seized in the valley on public display. It was also admitted by the
Maoist regional leadership that about 500 of their combatants had infiltrated the valley
for the purpose but the assault was cancelled as the government forces killed their
leaders.
Fourthly, an economic blockade of the Kathmandu valley and disruption of supplies had
been envisaged. Kathmandu valley has its biggest weakness in having only one road
access. It, therefore, said, “Kathmandu is the most vulnerable place to a fighting like the
one going on in other parts of the country. Having a big concentration of population, it is
easier to spread panic, a detriment to the lawful government. Its biggest weakness is the
road access, which is in effect only one. If somehow the rebels succeed partially or
wholly to strangulate the valley resulting into disruption of supplies we can envisage a
situation that can hardly be manageable for maintaining peace and security.” The Maoist
blockades came in the summer of 2004 but in a milder form than contemplated.
Fifthly, the logical measure to follow an effective economic blockade could be nothing
less than a situation under which “we may also see food, medicine and other necessities
air-dropped for the survival of the valley people. Under such circumstance, we will revert
back to the last days of the Ranas in 1950 when propaganda pamphlets were distributed
over the valley by aircrafts flying from India.” The valley blockade of 2004 led to an
emergency meeting of the Indian cabinet and broached over a contingency plan to airdrop
the provisions, if necessary.
Sixth, the only situation that has not yet arisen as contemplated in that 2002 article is the
evacuation of the foreign community from the capital. However, there was a contingency
plan in place to evacuate the diplomatic corps and the expatriate community from the
valley by helicopters. There are two helipads available within the premises of the foreign
embassies in Kathmandu. Moreover, the American Peace Corp volunteers were returned
home following a grenade blast by the rebels at the American Center resulting into minor
physical damage but no human injury.
“Worse comes to the worst,” it said, “there might be evacuation of the foreign community
residing in the capital. Would it be like the Saigon evacuation at the end of the
Vietnamese War? Alternatively, would it be like the Kabul rescue operation of the
foreigners on the eve of Taliban onslaught over that city? The world offers too many
4

examples that can repeat amidst us given the kind of civil war we are already in. Who can
say there won’t be mass refugees streaming down to India from different parts of Nepal?
An exodus of the hundreds of villagers, if not in thousands, has already taken place from
the Maoist-affected areas in the western part of Nepal. Will it not bring back the crisis
that marked the Indo-Bangladesh border just before the Indian intervention in East
Pakistan and birth of a new nation in 1971?” Early 2005, India raised the issue of
Nepalese refugees taking shelter in India following the violent ethnic clashes in
Kapilbastu district.
Seventh, regarding New Delhi talks the prediction came close to fulfillment. “If ever such
a situation (New Delhi talks) arises, we will again go back to 1950 when the armed
revolution launched by Nepali Congress against the Rana regime in collaboration of the
king ended at Delhi talks. Any peace talks on the current resolution of Nepalese crisis
will likewise have three sides, the Maoists, the democrats and the king. Mr. B.P.Koirala
has, in his memoirs, described how the Delhi negotiations were held by keeping the
Nepalese warring factions of those days in isolation and the Indian mediators dictating
the terms. In all probabilities, the nature of the future talks, if held in the Indian soil, will
not be different from that of 1950. The attitude of India towards Nepal and that of Nepal
towards India has not changed over the last 50 years. It has in fact hardened.”
The New Delhi talks took place with the successive visits of the Nepalese leaders to India
first by Nepali Congress President Girija Prasad Koirala followed by RPP Chairman
Pashupati Shumsher Rana and UML Secretary General Madhav Kumar Nepal in early
months of 2004. Close on their heels, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba visited India
in the beginning of September. King Gyanendra paid his visit to India in November of
2004. As the top Maoist leaders were residing in India, there was no difficulty in getting
all of them together. Although no formal talk took place in New Delhi on Nepal between
Indian and Nepalese leaders, the Indian government played a key role in the Nepalese
crisis arising from the Maoist insurgency and later from the royal action.
Eighth, the most important was the outcome of the likely Delhi talks. It had clearly said,
“In 1950, India had just achieved its independence and there was Jawahar Lal Nehru as
Prime Minister who was a liberal, democrat and an idealist. Today, India is conservative,
pragmatic and matter-of-factly. It feels Nepal is too troublesome. The emerging crisis in
Nepal may give a good opportunity to India to say enough is enough and cut it down to
size. Nepal should no longer be a nuisance or a pain in India’s neck. It won’t be
surprising in this context to see an outcome from tripartite negotiations among the
Nepalese warring factions held under the Indian auspices, comparable to the position of
Bhutan to the best and to that of Sikkim to the worst.”
Nepal headed towards positioning itself like Bhutan in relations with India. By virtue of
the India-Bhutan Treaty of 1949, India controls the foreign relations and defense of
Bhutan irrespective of its status as an independent sovereign country, which is also a
5

member of the United Nations. Nepal’s defense system went too close to India with
continued supply of arms and training provided by New Delhi. Even the arms supplied by
the US to Nepal for combating the Maoists guerrillas in Nepal came with due consent of
India. The heavy dependence of Nepal on India on this matter has its explicit impact on
other aspects of bilateral relationship that is reminiscent of India’s relations with Bhutan
Regarding violence, it was foreseen not coming to an end even after the Maoists
renounced it. I had said in 2002, “The constitutional framework does not make room for a
violent activity but violence made its presence felt in the country. Therefore, even if the
Maoists renounce violence permanently with the successful outcome of any potential
talks, there is no guarantee that violence will end forever in Nepal. The splinter group in
the Maoist cadre is an indication towards this direction. There would be many more such
groups emerging until the basic conditions remain the same.” 8
“Until the real issues of the people are addressed, violence will remain an unavoidable
feature of Nepalese political life. Poverty and desperation in the Nepalese society are a
perennial source of violence. Geography is a favorable factor for it. It is just a question of
new disgruntled organizers how far they could go in making it an effective instrument. In
the wake of current violence, we crave for peace talks leading to permanent peace. Peace
talks by itself are no solution. It is again only a means to a solution. Most of us are
thinking in terms of sharing power among the contending forces. That might bring about
a political solution but might not eradicate violence. To do away with violence we must
get to the roots of our problems. We know what they are – development, justice, and
equity.” 9 It is self-explanatory in the present context of 2007.
Similarly, what was said in 1991 that democracy would fail in Nepal actually did come
out true in 2002 after a decade or so. The article, Democracy in Undemocratic Nepal,
published in The Independent of November 20, 1991 turned out very prophetic. It was the
time when the people’s movement against the absolute monarchy had just succeeded and
a parliamentary democracy had been introduced. A 30-year old citadel of the Panchayat
system under the direct leadership of the king had fallen down under the stress of mass
revolt and the protesting political leaders had taken over the reins of control. A fully
democratic constitution was underway with guarantee to individual and political freedom
and fundamental human rights. It was the time when the fate of an active monarchy was
thought sealed for good. It was the time when the people felt liberated from political
suppression and demonstrated great sense of sacrifice and commitment to democracy.
The article was a little cynical about working a fully democratic system in Nepal.
Therefore, it said, “Democracy has come to stay in a basically undemocratic Nepal.” It
did not take more than a decade to see the citadel of democracy shaking. When the king
dismissed an elected prime minister on October 4, 2002, my fears were not far-fetched.
Not that I did not like democracy but that certain preconditions must exist for its success,
which, I believed, did not in Nepal. It becomes all the more difficult to make it work in a
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society where the most responsible people behave most irresponsibly. That is why
democracy faced a crossroad in 2002. (end)
(Aditya Man Shrestha is a senior journalist of Nepal and an author of several books, of
which Bleeding Mountains of Nepal had become the best seller. He also wrote The
Dreadful Night, Carnage at the Royal Palace and Wrong We Do, Right We Don’t. He is
currently based in the US and can be reached at adityaman@hotmail.com.
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